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Abstract
Inspired by the word game Ghost, we propose a new protocol for bipartisan redistricting in
which partisan players take turns assigning precincts to districts. We prove that in an idealized
setting, if both parties have the same number votes, then under optimal play in our protocol,
both parties win the same number of seats. We also evaluate our protocol in more realistic
settings that show how our game nearly eliminates the first-player advantage exhibited in other
redistricting protocols.
1 Introduction
Legislators across the United States are elected from voting districts, and these voting districts
are modified every ten years to reflect changes in population distribution, as measured by the U.S.
Census. Redistricting is the responsibility of state governments, and if a given state government
is led by either major political party, then the resulting redistricting may be drawn to benefit
that party. This effect has been called partisan gerrymandering ever since Governor Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts approved a redrawing of voting districts in 1812—one district resembled
the profile of a salamander, as famously lambasted by a political cartoon in the Boston Gazette [7].
Over 200 years later, partisan gerrymandering continues to be a significant issue. In 2017, the
plaintiffs in U.S. Supreme Court case Gill v. Whitford used the so-called efficiency gap statistic [15]
to argue that the voting districts for the Wisconsin State Assembly were drawn in a way that
disproportionally wastes votes that were cast by Democrats. In 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court struck down the 2011 congressional map as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander; here,
the plantiffs leveraged Markov Chain–based techniques to sample the space of admissible maps
and make informative comparisons with the map in question [5]. This trend of policing partisan
gerrymandering in the courts has led to a flurry of relevant mathematical research, primarily in
Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling methods [6, 3, 9, 8, 16] and in evaluating various fairness
criteria [4, 14, 1, 2, 10]. However, in light of recent changes to the U.S. Supreme Court bench, a
new approach might be necessary to effectively combat partisan gerrymandering in the future.
Along these lines, one prominent approach is to prevent partisan gerrymandering by changing
the way maps are drawn in the first place. For example, several states now delegate mapmaking
powers to a non-partisan or bipartisan redistricting commission so as to minimize the effects of
partisan politics. In order for such a redistricting commission to succeed, one must either identify
sufficiently independent agents, or design a protocol that ensures an independent outcome despite
partisan inputs. Pegden, Procaccia and Yu [11] recently proposed one such protocol based on “I-
cut-you-choose” solutions to classical cake-cutting problems. Given the task of partitioning a state
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into k districts, their I-cut-you-freeze protocol is a game in which two partisan players make moves
that iteratively determine a partition. The first player draws an admissible map of k proposed
districts and passes the map to the second player. For each subsequent turn, a player “freezes” one
of the proposed districts in the map she’s given, and then redraws the remainder of the map into
proposed districts before passing the map back to the other player. Each of these moves freezes an
additional district, and so gameplay ends after k such moves. The main result in [11] characterizes
the number of districts won under optimal play in the case where districts have no geometric
constraints (e.g., each district need not be contiguous). Under optimal play, this protocol produces
districts that exhibit partisan symmetry as k → ∞, but for the smaller k that we encounter in
the real world, the I-cut-you-freeze protocol gives substantial advantage to the first player. For
example, there are currently five states with only k = 2 U.S. congressional districts, in which case
the first player serves as de facto mapmaker, while the second player has no input in the process.
In this paper, we propose an alternative game that does not suffer from such first-player advan-
tage. Taking inspiration from the word game Ghost, we design a game in which partisan players
take turns assigning precincts to districts. In the non-geometric setting, we prove that both players
win the same number of districts when they have the same number of votes. We also test our
game in the geometric setting, where we observe that our game produces districts that exhibit
partisan symmetry. When optimally playing our game to redistrict New Hampshire (based on
election returns from the 2016 presidential election), we achieve proportional results—no matter
which partisan player moves first. In the following section, we introduce our game and discuss how
it performs in the geometric setting. Section 3 contains our theoretical result, and we discuss our
results in Section 4.
2 Utility Ghost and bipartisan redistricting
Our protocol is motivated by the word game Ghost : Two players alternate presenting letters,
and the first to either spell an English word or create a string that does not start a word loses.
We introduce a variant called Utility Ghost, which requires a language L and utility functions
u1, u2 : L → R. (We only consider finite languages.) As in Ghost, players alternate presenting
letters. If either player creates a string that does not start a word in L, he receives −∞ utility.
Otherwise, one of the players eventually spells a word w ∈ L, in which case player 1 (i.e., the
player who made the first move) receives utility u1(w) and player 2 receives utility u2(w). The goal
of each player is to maximize utility. As an example, letting E and S denote the sets of English
and Spanish words consisting of at least three letters, one could play Utility Ghost with language
L = E ∪ S and utility functions defined by
u1(w) = −u2(w) =

1 if w ∈ E \ S
0 if w ∈ E ∩ S
−1 if w ∈ S \ E.
In this instance of Utility Ghost,1 the first player attempts to spell an English word, while the
second player attempts to spell a Spanish word. Overall, the rules of gameplay in Utility Ghost are
effectively the same as in Ghost—all that has changed are the players’ objectives.
We propose Utility Ghost as a gamification of bipartisan redistricting. Suppose a bipartisan
commission is tasked with partitioning n labeled atoms into k admissible districts; here, atoms
may be census blocks, precincts, or counties, for example. We consider a language L ⊆ Σn over
1Almost every first move from the English alphabet has a response in {e´, n˜, o´}, with the exception of q. Under
optimal play, the first player wins this game since the word “qubit” can be forced.
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the alphabet Σ = [n]× [k]. Here, the symbol (a, b) ∈ Σ should be interpreted as instructions of the
form “assign atom a to district b.” In practice, districts are required to satisfy several constraints,
and so we define L to correspond to the choices of districts that satisfy these constraints. Split
the bipartisan commission into two players according to party, and then have them play Utility
Ghost to partition a state into districts. In words, partisan players take turns assigning atoms
to districts.2 In this setup, the ith utility function counts the number of districts carried by the
ith player’s party for i ∈ {1, 2}. This definition of utility requires perfect information about voter
preference, which can be estimated in practice using prior election data.
For the sake of illustration, we play out a small redistricting instance of Utility Ghost. For
this game, the task is to partition a state into two contiguous districts, each composed of three
counties. Take the atoms to be counties, which have the same number of voters. Four counties
vote unanimous-red, and the other two vote unanimous-blue. Suppose the first player (P1) seeks
to maximize the number of districts that are majority-red, while the second player (P2) maximizes
majority-blue districts. What follows is an example of optimal play in this setting:
P1−→
1
P2−→
1
2
P1−→
1
2
2
P2−→
1
2
2 2
P1−→
1 1
2
2 2
P2−→
1 1
1 2
2 2
Notice that since both districts must be contiguous, P2’s first move ensures that both blue counties
will end up residing in district 2, thereby securing a majority-blue district.
In the next section, we solve redistricting instances of Utility Ghost in which atoms are voters
(all of whom have known preference), and districts are only required to contain the same number of
voters. In particular, we prove that both players win the same number of districts when they have
the same number of votes. But how are the results of this game impacted by the sort of geometric
constraints we encounter in the real world? When the game is sufficiently small, it can be naively
solved using the standard minimax algorithm. We followed this approach in two settings:
2.1 Redistricting a decomino state
Consider the decomino state depicted in Figure 1, which is made up of 10 square counties of
equal size. Assume that each county contains the same sized population and number of voters,
and each county unanimously votes for either A or B. Our task is to partition the decomino
state into two contiguous districts of five counties. Exactly seven maps satisfy these constraints.
When we randomly draw a voter distribution, we may solve the corresponding instance of Utility
Ghost (with A as first player) and count the resulting number of majority-A districts. On average,
we obtain a symmetric votes–seats curve (depicted in Figure 1), whereas the curve arising from
gerrymandering for A (or B) is particularly asymmetric. Note that since there are only two districts,
these gerrymandered results would arise from the I-cut-you-freeze protocol proposed in [11] with
first player A (B, respectively).
2.2 Redistricting New Hampshire
New Hampshire is made up of 10 counties and currently has two U.S. Congressional voting districts.
If we require each district to be contiguous and comprised of counties, and furthermore, that the
difference in district populations be less than 10 percent of the entire population (according to the
2010 U.S. Census), then there are seven admissible maps. Once we know the voter distributions of
2In a real-world implementation of this game, the player also provides an admissible completion of the current
map in order to demonstrate that the selected assignment is allowed.
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Figure 1: (top) Consider a state consisting of 10 unit-square counties that must be divided into
two voting districts. By assumption, each county contains the same sized population. There are
only seven districtings that do not split any county while satisfying contiguity and one person–one
vote. The geometry of the state imposes nontrivial structure in these districtings. For example, the
top-right and bottom-left counties are always assigned to different districts. (bottom) Let A and
B denote the two major parties. Assume that each county unanimously votes for either A or B and
with equal voter turnout. Fix x ∈ {0, . . . , 10}, and consider all possible voter distributions with
exactly x unanimous-A counties. Draw such a voter distribution uniformly at random and perform
four experiments: (1) collect the number of majority-A districts for each of the seven districtings;
(2) identify the maximum number of majority-A districts among the seven districtings; (3) identify
the minimum number of majority-A districts among the seven districtings; and (4) play Utility
Ghost optimally (with A making the first move) to select a districting and then compute the
resulting number of majority-A districts. Perform this experiment for 100 independent random
draws of voter distributions for each x ∈ {0, . . . , 10}. The above plots illustrate the sample mean
and standard deviation of (1)–(4), respectively. In words, the far-left plot represents a votes–seats
curve for a random districting, the middle-left plot corresponds to gerrymandering for A, middle-
right to gerrymandering for B, and far-right to the outcome of Utility Ghost. As expected, random
admissible districtings exhibit partisan symmetry. Utility Ghost appears to mimic this same notion
of partisan symmetry, whereas the I-cut-you-freeze protocol [11] would produce the gerrymandered
results in this case.
4
Figure 2: New Hampshire is made up of 10 counties, illustrated on the left. Currently, New
Hampshire has two U.S. congressional districts. Consider all possible partitions of New Hampshire
into two contiguous districts such that none of the counties are split, and such that the difference
in district populations is less than 10 percent of the entire population (according to the 2010 U.S.
Census). There are seven such partitions, illustrated above. Here, we color the districts according
to which party received more votes in the 2016 presidential election. Using this election data as
a proxy for voter preferences, one of the seven admissible districtings results in two congressional
seats for the Democrats, whereas the remaining six give a proportional result. If the Democrats
play first in the I-cut-you-freeze protocol [11], then they get to select the districting that wins both
seats. On the other hand, in the Utility Ghost protocol we introduced, Republicans avoid this
worst-case map under optimal play, regardless of which party plays first.
each county, then we can solve this instance of Utility Ghost. Here, we used the 2016 presidential
election returns as a proxy for voter distribution. This election was very close, with Hillary Clinton
receiving 47.62 percent of the vote and Donald Trump receiving 47.25 percent. It therefore comes
as no surprise that six out of the seven admissible maps produce proportional results under this
proxy. Still, one of the admissible maps gives both seats to the Democrats, and this would be the
map selected by the I-cut-you-freeze protocol [11] if Democrats play first. Thankfully, optimal play
under the Utility Ghost protocol avoids this map, regardless of which party plays first.
3 Theory
In this section, we focus on the redistricting instances of Utility Ghost in which atoms are voters (all
of whom have known preference), and the districts are only required to contain the same number
of voters (i.e., we impose no geometric constraints on the districts). Furthermore, exactly half of
the voters have preference for one party, while the other half have preference for the other party.
How many districts do partisan players win under optimal play?
It is convenient to abstract this particular instance of Utility Ghost in terms of balls and bins.
Fix positive integers j and m. Two players take turns placing one of n = 2j(2m+ 1) balls into one
of k = 2j bins, each of capacity 2m + 1. Half of the balls are white, and the other half are black.
By design, n and k are both even, and each bin has odd capacity so that the notion of majority
is unambiguous. The first player (P1) wins a bin if it contains a majority of white balls (at least
m + 1), otherwise the second player (P2) wins that bin. At the end of the game, the player with
the most bins wins. If both players win half (i.e., j) of the bins, the game ends in a tie. We refer
to this game as the (j,m)-balanced redistricting game.
Theorem 1 (Main result). Suppose m > 14j. Then under optimal play, the (j,m)-balanced
redistricting game ends in a tie.
Lemma 2. In the (j,m)-balanced redistricting game, P2 can force a tie.
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If in round r, there exists a bin in Sr,1 that contains fewer than m + 1 white balls, and
furthermore, there is a white ball available to play, then:
• If r = 1, then P1 plays the default move.
• If in round r − 1, P2 played white, then P1 plays the default move.
• If in round r − 1, P2 played black in some bin b 6∈ Sr−1,2, then:
– If b contains exactly one ball and there exists an empty bin b′ ∈ Sr,1, then P1 plays
white in b′.
– Otherwise, P1 plays the default move.
• If in round r − 1, P2 played black in some bin b ∈ Sr−1,2, then:
– If b contains exactly one ball and there exists an empty bin b′ ∈ Sr,1, then P1 plays
white in b′.
– Else if b contains fewer than m + 1 white balls, then P1 plays white in b.
– Otherwise, P1 plays the default move.
Otherwise, P1 plays arbitrarily.
Table 1: Strategy for P1 in (j,m)-balanced redistricting game. We say P1 plays “the default move”
in round r if he plays white in any of the most full bins in Sr,1 with fewer than m + 1 white balls.
Proof. Arbitrarily label the bins with {(a, b)}a∈{±1},b∈[j]. We propose the following strategy for P2:
At each round, P1 puts a ball of some color in bin (a, b), and P2 responds by putting a ball of the
opposite color in bin (−a, b). We claim that such moves are always possible, and that under this
play, the game ends in a tie. To this end, a simple induction argument gives both of the following:
(i) After each round, the number of white balls remaining equals the number of black balls
remaining.
(ii) After each round, the number of white/black balls in (a, b) equals the number of black/white
balls in (−a, b) for every a ∈ {±1} and b ∈ [j].
By (i), the fact that P1’s move was possible in a given round implies that P2’s move is also possible.
The desired tie follows from applying (ii) to the last round.
Lemma 3. Suppose m > 14j. Then in the (j,m)-balanced redistricting game, P1 can force a tie.
Before describing a strategy for P1, we need an important definition. Immediately before Pi’s
turn in round r, let l be the number of majority-white bins, and select any min{j, l} of these bins
with the most white balls along with any max{j − l, 0} additional bins with the fewest total balls.
Let Sr,i denote the set comprised of these j bins. Table 1 uses this definition to prescribe a strategy
for P1, and as we will show, this strategy forces a tie. First, we show that this strategy prescribes
legal moves for P1:
Lemma 4. For every round, Table 1 determines a legal move for P1.
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Proof. We only need to consider rounds r for which there exists a bin in Sr,1 that contains fewer
than m + 1 white balls, and furthermore, a white ball is available for P1 to play. Let Ar,i and Br,i
denote the number of empty bins in Sr,i and S
c
r,i, respectively. We will use induction to prove that
the following hold simultaneously:
(i) Ar,2 ≤ Br,2.
(ii) The bins in Sr,2 that are not majority-white are empty.
(iii) In round r, the above strategy determines a legal move for P1.
The claim clearly holds for r = 1. Now suppose it holds for a given r ≥ 1.
Case I: In round r, P2 plays white. If P2 plays white in an empty bin b, then this bin becomes
majority-white, and so by (ii) of the induction hypothesis (which we denote IH(ii) in the sequel),
b ∈ Sr+1,1 unless all of the bins in Sr,2 are already majority-white. After P1 plays the default move,
we either have Ar+1,2 = 0 ≤ Br+1,2 or
Ar+1,2 ≤ Ar+1,1 = Ar,2 − 1 ≤ Br,2 − 1 = Br+1,2 − 1 ≤ Br+1,2,
where the second inequality applies IH(i). If P2 plays white in a nonempty bin, then IH(ii) implies
Sr+1,1 = Sr,2. After P1 plays the default move, we then have Ar+1,2 ≤ Ar,2 ≤ Br,2 = Br+1,2, where
the second inequality applies IH(i). This proves (i). Next, (ii) continues to hold for round r+1 since
the balls played by P2 and P1 are both white. For (iii), note that IH(ii) and the above discussion
together gives that the bins in Sr+1,1 are all either majority-white or empty. Since by assumption,
there exists a bin in Sr+1,1 that contains fewer than n + 1 white balls, the default move is legal.
Case II: In round r, P2 plays black in some bin b 6∈ Sr,2. Then P1 responds in such a way that
Sr+1,2 = Sr+1,1 = Sr,2. If P2 plays black in an empty bin so that Br+1,1 = Br,2 − 1, then either
P1 plays white in an empty bin to make Ar+1,2 = Ar+1,1 − 1, or there is no empty bin available,
meaning Ar+1,2 = 0 ≤ Br+1,2. The former case gives
Ar+1,2 = Ar+1,1 − 1 = Ar,2 − 1 ≤ Br,2 − 1 = Br+1,2 = Br+1,2,
where the inequality follows from IH(i). Overall, we have (i). Next, there is only one new ball in
Sr+1,2 = Sr+1,1 = Sr,2, and it is white, so (ii) continues to hold. Finally, (iii) follows from IH(ii),
as in the previous case.
Case III: In round r, P2 plays black in some bin b ∈ Sr,2. If P2 plays black in an empty bin,
then by IH(i), there must be an empty bin outside Sr,2, resulting in an empty bin b
′ ∈ Sr+1,1, where
P1 plays white. As such, (i)–(iii) continue to hold in this subcase. If b was nonempty before P2
played black, then by IH(ii), b is either majority-white or tied before P1’s move. If tied, then b
contains fewer than m + 1 white balls, and so P1 plays white in b, thereby regaining the majority.
If majority-white, then P1 plays white in b or some bin in Sr,1. In particular, the default move is
legal. Regardless, (i)–(iii) continue to hold.
Observe that any white ball beyond m + 1 is unnecessary to obtain a majority in a bin. As
such, we say a bin containing x white balls has max{x,m + 1} non-wasted white balls. Let
f(r) denote the number of non-wasted white balls in Sr,2 immediately before P2’s turn in round r.
Observe that f is monotonically increasing in r, and that f(j(2m+ 1)) = j(m+ 1) implies P1 wins
at least half of the bins. In fact, under the above strategy, f is strictly increasing over rounds in
which a white ball is available for P1 to play:
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Lemma 5. If there exists a bin in Sr+1,1 that contains fewer than m+1 white balls, and furthermore,
there is a white ball for P1 to play in round r + 1, then Table 1 ensures
f(r + 1) ≥ f(r) + 1.
Proof. Let fr,i denote the number of non-wasted white balls in Sr,i immediately before Pi’s turn in
round r, so that f(r) = fr,2. If P2 plays white in round r, then fr+1,1 ≥ fr,2, and then P1 plays in
such a way that
f(r + 1) = fr+1,2 = fr+1,1 + 1 ≥ fr,2 + 1 = f(r) + 1.
If in round r, P2 plays black in some bin b 6∈ Sr,2, then Sr+1,1 = Sr,2, and then P1 plays in such a
way that
f(r + 1) = fr+1,2 = fr+1,1 + 1 = fr,2 + 1 = f(r) + 1.
If in round r, P2 plays black in some bin b ∈ Sr,2, then P1 similarly plays in such a way that
f(r + 1) = fr+1,2 = fr,2 + 1 = f(r) + 1.
As such, the only way P2 can prevent P1 from winning at least half of the bins is by playing
enough white balls that none are available for P1’s move in round j(m+1). Since there are j(2m+1)
white balls total, this means P1 needs to play white for almost all of these first rounds; specifically,
P2 must play strictly fewer than j − 1 black balls in the first j(m + 1) − 1 rounds. As we will
see, under this play, almost half of the white balls played by P2 in the early game will necessarily
contribute to f(r), thereby failing to keep P1 from winning half of the bins:
Lemma 6. Pick r > 2j and suppose m > 2r. If in the first r rounds, P2 plays at most j black
balls, then Table 1 ensures
f(r + 1) ≥
(
1 +
j − 1
2j − 1
)
(r − j) + 1.
Proof. Consider the state of the game immediately before P2’s turn in round r+1. Let l denote the
total number of majority-white bins, let e denote the total number of empty bins, let w1 ≥ · · · ≥
wl+e denote numbers of white balls in these majority-white and empty bins, and let W =
∑l
i=1wi
denote the total number of white balls in majority-white bins.
At this point in the game, at most j black balls have been played, and so at most j white balls
reside in bins that are not majority-white. As such, P2 contributed at least r − 2j white balls to
majority-white bins, while P1 has contributed r + 1, meaning W ≥ 2r − 2j + 1. Also, P1 played
the default move in all but at most j turns (i.e., when responding to P2 playing black in certain
ways), and so w1 ≥ r− j + 1. Furthermore, m > 2r ensures that every white ball played up to this
point is non-wasted, and so
f(r + 1) = w1 +
k∑
i=2
wi ≥ w1 + j − 1
l + e− 1
l+e∑
i=2
wi
=
(
1− j − 1
l + e− 1
)
w1 +
j − 1
l + e− 1W
≥
(
1− j − 1
l + e− 1
)
(r − j + 1) + j − 1
l + e− 1(2r − 2j + 1)
=
(
1 +
j − 1
l + e− 1
)
(r − j) + 1
≥
(
1 +
j − 1
2j − 1
)
(r − j) + 1.
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Proof of Lemma 3. The result is trivial when j = 1. Now suppose j ≥ 2. By Lemma 5, P1 forces
a tie if P2 plays more than j black balls in the first j(m+ 1)− 1 rounds. Now suppose P2 plays at
most j black balls in these rounds. Then Lemma 6 gives
f(7j + 1) ≥
(
1 +
j − 1
2j − 1
)
· 6j + 1 ≥ 8j + 1,
where the last step follows from the fact that j 7→ j−12j−1 is an increasing function for j ≥ 2.
Furthermore, a white ball is necessarily available for P1 to play in each of the first jm rounds. As
such, the monotonicity of f , Lemma 5, and the above inequality together give
f(j(2m + 1)) ≥ f(jm) ≥
(
jm− (7j + 1)
)
+ f(7j + 1) ≥ j(m + 1),
meaning P1 wins at least half of the bins, as desired.
4 Discussion
In this paper, we introduce Utility Ghost, a game-based redistricting protocol in which two players
take turns assigning atoms (that could be voting precincts, counties, or even individual houses) to
districts. The theoretical analysis in this paper proves that, in the non-geometrically constrained
version of the game (where districts are not required to be contiguous, for example), if each player
has half of the votes, then both players have a strategy to win half of the districts. We also report
numerical experiments in small-scale settings (where we can solve the game by naively implementing
the minimax algorithm), showing that partisan symmetry is obtained under optimal play.
Note that the notion of optimal play assumes a particular utility function for each player,
which in this case is simply the number of seats won. In practice, players could have very different
objectives; for instance, the majority party might aim to maximize the safety of its majority instead
of maximizing the number of seats. Such an objective implicitly requires a probabilistic model for
the vote, and presumably, the atoms’ random vote variables are highly correlated (cf. [13]). One
could also consider non-partisan objectives like favoring incumbents, or even a combination of
different objectives. In these cases, the protocol would not change, only the utility functions u1
and u2, but the game would not necessarily be zero-sum and interesting properties may arise.
In order to analyze large-scale instances of Utility Ghost (say, with larger states, smaller atoms,
and/or more districts), different techniques will be required. Presumably, one could leverage state-
of-the-art deep neural networks that learn how to play board games like chess and Go through
self-play [12]. Such an approach would use a set of admissible maps to determine the set of valid
moves at each turn and learn an evaluation function that is implemented by a neural network.
The set of admissible maps should satisfy various (possibly state-specific) legal constraints such as
one person–one vote, geographic compactness, and restrictions arising from the Voting Rights Act.
Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling could be used to produce a small, but representative set of
maps [3]. The complexity of the game depends chiefly on the number of atoms, which equals the
number of turns in the game. It would be interesting to design relevant atoms that take political
geography into consideration.
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